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Discussion after the Speeches of Justice John Sopinka
and Robert Coulson
QUESTION, Mr. Miller: Is it correct to say that mediation is a deci-
sion-making process?
ANSWER, Mr. Coulson: No, I think there is a difference between medi-
ation and decision-making. Mediation is an extension of negotiation. If
the parties choose to settle, they have reached a settlement; they do not
reach a decision. The only decisions made are those concerning which
concessions should be made in order to reach settlement.
Arbitration is different. The parties cannot reach a settlement, and
in order to avoid going to court, they select an arbitrator to make a
decision.
QUESTION, Professor King: There are several companies in the United
States that have been in the forefront in using mini-trials. Do you think
this can be done internationally?
ANSWER, Justice Sopinka: I do not think there is a national problem
involved in negotiating - one can negotiate anywhere in the world. The
mini-trial is simply a sophisticated way to negotiate a settlement.
QUESTION, Mr. Edwards: Could you please comment on the differ-
ences and advantages between a reasoned award and a conclusory award
in an arbitration case?
ANSWER, Mr. Coulson: It depends on what the parties want. In the
United States, it is customary to have reasoned awards in labor cases,
alimony cases, international cases, and in a few arbitration systems set up
by statute. But it is the general custom and practice in commercial con-
struction arbitration in United States to have no opinion. Most lawyers
and arbitrators would like opinions; but many business people feel that
they need a decision which will be easily confirmed in court. Without an
opinion, the court has no way of knowing why the panel reached a deci-
sion. This probably makes the arbitration award less likely to be
appealed.
Some may ask, how can we be sure that justice is done? Well, most
business people do not care about whether or not justice is done. They
simply want a process for dispute resolution. They are not concerned
with setting precedent or discovering who is at fault.
ANSWER, Justice Sopinka: If no reasons are given, trial judges can jus-
tify their opinion by saying that they reached their decision based on the
evidence. The court is very reluctant to interfere with such a pronounce-
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ment. If the judge says nothing, counsel is free to speculate that the
judge made the decision based on an error of law.
It seems to me that the same would be true in the case of an arbitra-
tion. It could be speculated that the arbitrator made errors in arriving at
his conclusion.
QUESTION, Mr. O'Grady: What do you see as the supervisory role of
the court in a system where a large part of civil litigation is in fact con-
ducted on a private level?
ANSWER, Justice Sopinka: I think it should depend on the consensus
that is reflected to some extent in Canadian law. For instance, if the
parties have specifically agreed to confer jurisdiction on the arbitrator to
deal with the law, then the court should have no supervisory role. This
should be the case unless the arbitrator has participated in some egre-
gious denial of natural justice.
If the parties want everything decided by the arbitrator, they should
be allowed to agree to this without interference from the court. How-
ever, the agreement must clearly state whether the arbitrator is to have
the final decision or whether some degree of judicial review is to be
allowed.
ANSWER, Mr. Coulson: It is different in the United States where it is a
legislative question. Congress has told the courts what role they are to
have in private arbitration. The courts are to enforce all arbitration
clauses that have been negotiated. They must enforce arbitration awards
unless the four or five very narrow grounds for vacating the award exist.
Judges in the United States have a growing tendency to retire from
the bench and become private arbitrators. This is interesting when the
ceremonial value of the court is considered. Parties to arbitration do not
have much interest in ceremonial things. Arbitrators are not asked to
wear robes; they do not have an American Flag hanging behind them;
and, the rules of evidence are not usually requested, although such a re-
quest could be made. It is apparent that many of the elements of a typi-
cal courtroom can be dispensed with. All that is needed is a person who
has the background, the knowledge, and the experience to understand
the dispute, and to come to a decision about an award. All that the par-
ties want is a chance to tell their side, with their lawyer representing
them. They are willing in most cases to abide by the award. That may
be a difference of perception between business people and lawyers.
QUESTION, Mr. Stayin: The National Machine Tool Builders Associa-
tion recently conducted a survey of their members and found that 90%
of their cases were settled before trial, and about 10% went to litigation.
They won 9% of those cases. I would suggest that contrary to some of
the views expressed, one of the most important qualities of a good attor-
ney is the ability to mediate between his client and the other attorney.
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Apparently, in respect to the Machine Tool Builders, 90% of their cases
are mediated that way.
I would like to ask both of you whether you have a view as to
whether there are cases that definitely should go to trial and those that
should be sent into arbitration.
ANSWER, Justice Sopinka: I do not believe that you can look at a case
and say this is an arbitration case. So much depends on what sort of a
solution the parties want. If they want a quick solution with very little
judicial interference, then they are better off going to arbitration. But in
deciding whether they should or should not go to arbitration, if there are
a lot of thorny questions of law involved, I would not want an arbitrator
making the final decisions. It would probably be better to go to court in
that situation. I would want to leave as many avenues open for my client
as possible.
ANSWER, Mr. Coulson: I have a someivhat different point of view. I
think cases should not go to arbitration when they involve issues of pub-
lic policy. The parties should not be allowed to negotiate a solution in
such a situation. This would eliminate major criminal cases, and cases
which involve the interests of broad numbers of people who would not be
parties.
I also think that the only cases that should go to arbitration are the
ones in which the parties decide that they want to arbitrate. They can
decide this at the time they enter into a contract, or at the time the dis-
pute arises. I really look on it as part of the Democratic process. I think
people should also have the right to settle their own disputes, and they
should have the right to use a mediator. If they cannot settle a particular
issue, they should have the right to pick an arbitrator and proceed under
a set of rules.
QUESTION, Mr. Roman: I would like to know whether questions
which involve governments, but not necessarily any state principles or
any complex issues of constitutional law, can also be arbitrated, or would
it be impossible to get governments to participate in arbitration. After
all, it does not cost the government anything to litigate an issue, because
the cost comes out of the budget of the Department of Justice. In addi-
tion, if the government never has to admit that it is wrong, then it never
has to accept responsibility for its conduct.
ANSWER, Mr. Coulson: One of the purposes of the dispute resolution
act which Congress passed last year was to encourage federal agencies to
create innovative programs which would give swifter remedies to people
who come in conflict with government agencies. However, I do not think
that anybody should be forced to arbitrate with the government. If it is
in their best interest, they should be given an opportunity to enter into a
contractual arbitration clause with the government.
QUESTION, Mr. Edwards: I want to ask about the question of consent
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in two areas. The first involves the labor area. When proceeding with
collective bargaining agreements the union may agree, but the question is
whether the workers will necessarily agree. The second involves the se-
curities area where the average individual who deals with a brokerage
firm does not have much choice in this matter because standard forms
are used.
ANSWER, Mr. Coulson: Those are very good examples of how far you
can push this process. The theory of using arbitration with collective
bargaining is that when a majority of the workers elect a union, the
union, under the law, is given the right to negotiate on behalf of the
entire bargaining unit. The pattern in the United States is to have bar-
gaining between the individual union and the individual employer in
most cases, resulting in a three-year collective bargaining contract that
covers many terms. One of the terms is the grievance procedure, where
the union is given the right to negotiate with the employer on behalf of
all its members through various steps in the grievance procedure. It is
then usually submitted to one form of arbitration or another.
For most American workers, this system works pretty well. How-
ever, for a worker who is in the minority of the union, it may not work so
well. In such a case, there is an applicable doctrine of American law
known as unfair representation. This gives the individual employee the
right to sue the union, and the union has the right to bring in the em-
ployer. So in an egregious case where an individual employee is treated
unfairly, there is an opportunity for a lawsuit in Federal Court.
The securities field has a different problem. Many securities firms
will accept a client without entering into any agreement at all if it is a
cash account. But if the client is on margin, there probably is an agree-
ment which states that the client must agree to arbitrate disputes. In
addition, the client must agree to arbitrate before the National Associa-
tion Security Dealers, the New York Stock Exchange, and the American
Stock Exchange. Of course, if the client is unhappy with this arrange-
ment, he can do business with people who would put the American Arbi-
tration Association in the clause, or else take it out entirely.
Since clients do have such an option, there is not too much of a
problem with consent in the securities area. The reason the Supreme
Court of the United States upheld the securities arbitration system is be-
cause it feels that the securities industry is a regulated industry due to its
regulation by the SEC. It is a benefit to the industry to have a private
tribunal. Because the SEC feels that these tribunals are reasonably fair,
and because they operate under the supervision of the SEC, the system
has been accepted by the Supreme Court.
QUESTION, Mr. Robinson: A question for Mr. Justice Sopinka. You
mentioned the Zuber report with approval. Subsequent to the Zuber re-
port, even though it did not recommend one, Ontario has a developing
Vol. 17:527 1991
4
Canada-United States Law Journal, Vol. 17 [1991], Iss. 2, Art. 40
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cuslj/vol17/iss2/40
Couson and Sopinka-DISCUSSION
commercial court. It is modeled on the English commerical court, which
is just a panel of judges.
There were comments to the effect that the creation of the commer-
cial court was white collar law versus blue collar law. Do you think that
it is a good idea to have particular panels of the bench with responsibility
for particular areas of expertise? Does this assist the streamlining and
speeding up of the judicial process?
ANSWER, Justice Sopinka: I am not convinced that we should have
specialized courts. I think that sometimes judges who specialize have
very firm views. Matters of expertise should be decided on the basis of
expert evidence, rather than on personal views. When I was arguing
before the court, I was always concerned if I had a judge who was a
noted expert in the area that we were litigating. It was likely that he
would have firm views, and I could never be sure which side they would
favor.
On the other hand, I think it makes a lot of sense when appointing
judges who will be dealing with commercial cases to make sure that there
are a representative number of them who have done commercial type
work in particular. The chief justice can then decide who to assign to a
particular case. But I am not a big supporter of having a commercial
court composed of a regular panel of judges that does nothing but decide
commercial cases. I think that it is often better to have a fresh view.
Then a decision can be made after listening to the evidence and the argu-
ments. Sometimes this results in a better decision.
COMMENT, Mr. Shanker: After hearing what has been said here yes-
terday and today, it seems to me that a distinction should be made be-
tween arbitration and settlement.
An arbitrator is just as much a judge as a judge who sits on a court
to the extent that he is given the power to enter judgments by the State.
This is simply because the judicial system does not have enough judges to
do the job, and has become so ceremonial and bogged down in its proce-
dures that people prefer other kinds of judges. Arbitrators are judges,
and the State enforces that judicial power.
It seems to me that Mr. Coulson was suggesting that there is an-
other process which he called the settlement process. In this process,
where no person has the final authority, at least you do not rely on the
final authority of some neutral person to decide the case. In the settle-
ment process, a spirit is engendered that suggests that you could be
wrong or that you have made errors. You call it the spirit of compromise
or the spirit of negotiations. I wish we would have more time to concen-
trate on how it is done.
COMMENT, Mr. Coulson: I do not want to give the impression that I
believe that arbitrators are just judges. I think it is really a different pro-
cess. Judges are appointed by the State to provide a public service.
There should be more judges, and the judges should be better paid.
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But arbitrators are different. The authority for the arbitrator's deci-
sion flows from the parties. It is the parties that have said that insofar as
this contract or dispute goes, we would prefer to have some voice in
choosing the person that hears our case and who makes the decision.
The State allows that. But it is not the State appointing the arbitrator. It
is the State approving of a system that allows people and corporations
the freedom to resolve their own disputes.
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